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Abstract
Transparency regulation aims at reducing financial fragility by strengthening
market discipline. There are however two elementary properties of banking that
may render such regulation inefficient at best and detrimental at worst. First, an
extensive financial safety net may eliminate the disciplinary effect of transparency
regulation. Second, achieving transparency is costly for banks, as it dilutes their
charter values, and hence it also reduces their private costs of risk-taking. We
consider both the direct costs of complying with disclosure requirements and the
indirect transparency costs stemming from imperfect property rights governing
information and specify the conditions under which transparency regulation can
(and cannot) reduce financial fragility.
Key words:  information disclosure, market discpline, bank transparency, deposit
insurance, financial safety net5
Tulisiko pankkitoiminnan avoimuutta lisätä?
Pankkien tiedonantovelvollisuussääntelyn tarkastelua
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita  10/2000
Ari Hyytinen – Tuomas Takalo
Rahoitusmarkkinaosasto
Tiivistelmä
Pankkitoiminnan tiedonantovelvollisuussääntelyllä pyritään lisäämään markkina-
kuria ja siten vahvistamaan pankkijärjestelmän vakautta. Pankkijärjestelmällä on
kuitenkin kaksi ominaisuutta, jotka saattavat heikentää tällaisen sääntelyn tehok-
kuutta. Ensinnäkin kattava pankkijärjestelmän turvaverkko saattaa vähentää
tiedonantovelvollisuuden markkinakuria vahvistavaa vaikutusta. Toiseksi tiedon-
antovelvollisuuksien lisääminen aiheuttaa pankeille kustannuksia, mikä osaltaan
vähentää pankkien kannattavuutta ja voi siten myös vähentää riskinottoon liittyviä
yksityisiä kustannuksia. Tarkastelemme tässä selvityksessä sekä suoria
tiedonantovelvollisuuden noudattamisesta syntyviä kustannuksia että epäsuoria
kustannuksia, jotka syntyvät informaatioon liittyvien omistusoikeuksien
määrittelemisen epätäydellisyydestä. Johdamme myös ehdot, joiden vallitessa
tiedonantovelvollisuuden laajentaminen vahvistaa (ja ei vahvista) pankki-
järjestelmän vakautta.
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1  Introduction
The aim of a safety net for the banking sector is to reduce financial fragility.
However, the existence of such a safety net entails a widely recognized moral
hazard problem. Safety nets in general, and depositor insurance schemes (DISs) in
particular, provide incentives for excessive risk taking by banks.
1 This concern
about moral hazard has recently led to a novel idea regarding regulation. It has
been argued that enhancing the transparency of the financial condition of banks
would expunge the moral hazard problem by strengthening market discipline.
2
The argument is that claimants are the more responsive to changes in banks’ risk
profiles, the more comprehensive the available information on banks’ financial
condition. Stringent transparency requirements should thus deter banks from ex-
cessive risk taking. As discussion of the transparency argument has been rather
informal, the main purpose of this article is to examine the validity of this argu-
ment in a stylized framework.
There is abundant evidence that weak transparency makes banks’ asset risks
opaque. Stock market participants including the professional analysts, such as
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, encounter difficulties in measuring banks'
creditworthiness and risk exposures (Poon, Firth, and Fung, 1999, Morgan, 1999,
and Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren, 2000). And academics face the same problems.
3
It is not easy to interpret banks’ accounting data (Beatty, Chamberlain and Ma-
gliolo 1995, Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen 1995, and Genay 1998) nor disclo-
sures of banks’ credit losses (Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas 1999, and US General
Accounting Office 1994). Rochet and Tirole (1996) note that interbank lending
complicates assessment of banks’ actual liquidity and solvency ratios.
To enhance the transparency of banking sectors, various international insti-
tutions, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, G7 Finance Min-
isters, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have campaigned for
improved accounting and disclosure practices (see eg Basel Committee 1998,
1999a, 1999b). Numerous scholars, such as Berlin, Saunders and Udell (1991),
Edwards and Mishkin (1995), Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998), Rosengren
(1998), Jordan, Peek and Rosengren (1999, 2000), and Heffernan (2000) also ad-
vocate a transparent banking system. Mayes (1997, 1998), and Mayes and Vesala
(1998) regard transparency as an instrument for improving both domestic and
                                                
1 There is a sizeable literature on the economics of bank regulation and design of safety nets. See
Dewatripoint and Tirole (1994) and Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998) for general reviews.
The link between moral hazard problems and the DIS is also well documented. Kane (1989), for
instance, regards the US safety net and fixed-rate DIS as main reasons for the Savings and Loan
crisis of the 1980s. Berlin et al (1991) provide a concise review of empirical literature on the DIS
and banking problems. Their conclusion is that ’the moral hazard problem is operative and signifi-
cant’ (p. 738). Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that an explicit DIS has increased the
fragility of the banking system around the world.
2 The concept of bank transparency is broad in scope. It refers to the quality and quantity of public
information on a bank’s risk profile and to the timing of its disclosure, including the bank's past
and current decisions and actions as well as its plans for the future. The transparency of the bank-
ing sector as a whole also includes public information on bank regulations and on safety-net op-
erations of the central bank (see eg Enoch et al 1997 and Rosengren 1998).
3 As Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, p. 476) put it, 'Indicators of business failures and nonper-
forming loans are also usually available only at low frequencies, if at all; the latter are also made
less informative by banks’ desire to hide their problems for as long as possible.'8
international banking supervision. These calls for increased transparency seem to
be well founded given the experience of recent banking crises around the world.
4
A bank can be transparent to market participants both before and after in-
vestments are made in the bank. In the H[SRVW sense, the degree of a bank’s trans-
parency determines the degree of information available to its claim-holders on the
bank’s financial condition. If it transpires that the value of a bank’s assets is low,
the bank’s creditors, and particularly its uninsured depositors, may withdraw their
funds. The threat of a bank run can then discipline bankers in their risk-taking (see
eg Calomiris and Khan 1991, Carletti 1999, Chen 1999 and Niinimäki 2000).
([DQWH transparency implies that SRWHQWLDO depositors and other creditors
can appreciate a bank’s financial condition prior to placing funds in it. This
strengthens market discipline, because the better investors are able to evaluate
banks' risk positions, the more risk-sensitive the banks’ funding costs should be.
5
The supply of funds to a bank is also directly related to the perceived soundness
of the bank. The contention that lower quality banks attract fewer uninsured de-
posits than higher quality banks has recently received sound empirical support
(see eg Park 1995, Billet, Garfinkel, O’Neal 1998, Park and Peristiani 1998,
Martinez Peria and Schmukler 1998, Goldberg and Hudgins 1999, and Jagtiani
and Lemieux 2000). Despite its importance, the ex ante transparency and its effect
on market discipline are seldom addressed in a clear conceptual framework. For
this reason, these are the focus of this study, and in what follows, we equate trans-
parency to its ex ante dimension.
Our main argument is that there are two elementary reasons why transpar-
ency regulation may be inefficient or even detrimental from the welfare stand-
point. First, an extensive DIS or, more generally, an extensive financial safety net
may prevent transparency regulation from reducing financial fragility. If deposits
are fully insured, there is no market discipline, regardless of how transparent the
banking system is. Second, achieving transparency is costly for banks, as it re-
duces their profits, and hence it also reduces their private costs of risk-taking.
These costs can be divided to two broad categories.
·  'LUHFWFRPSOLDQFHFRVWVmay arise becauseeffective transparency necessi-
tates public disclosure, ie providing market participants with accurate and
credible information on banks, and because the provision of such informa-
                                                
4 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for an excellent analysis of 26 banking crises in 20 countries
from the 1970s to the mid-1990s. They also discuss the recent financial crises in East Asia. The
link between financial crises and transparency is explicitly made eg by Summers (2000), who
argues that promoting transparency is both the best way to prevent crises and an effective policy
response to crises; by Jordan et al (1999), who suggest that transparency improves market disci-
pline in crises; by Rosengren (1998), who argues that transparency reduces the costs of crises; and
by Kiander and Vartia (1998), who provide evidence on the role of weak transparency in the Fin-
nish banking crisis of the early 1990s.
5 In this sense, ex ante transparency is based on the old notion that, if the price system works, it
conveys at least some relevant information (see eg Hayek 1945 and Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).9
tion is costly.
6 To achieve transparency, banks should regularly produce
comprehensive information eg on their financial performance and solvency,
risk-management policy, risk exposures in various dimensions, general
business strategy, accounting policy, and corporate governance systems (see
eg Basel Committee 1998a).
7 At the very least, such disclosure requires a
well-functioning information and bookkeeping system, labor inputs from the
accounting, risk management and IT departments, and binds the scarce re-
sources of banks.
·  ,QGLUHFWFRPSOLDQFHFRVWVmay arise from the information intensity of lend-
ing decisions and from the weak protection of LQIRUPDWLRQDO property. As
known at least since the influential article by Arrow (1962), it is hard to ap-
propriate the rents on investments in information production, because prop-
erty rights governing information are weak. Transparency regulation almost
by definition worsens these appropriability problems.
8 In a recent article
Anand and Galetovic (1999) point out that the information that financial in-
termediaries produce can be treated as either a private good or a public
good. Should the monitoring information be private, greater transparency
could diminish the banks’ monopoly power over certain customers or cus-
tomer groups. Should the monitoring information be a public good, greater
transparency could enhance the incentive to free-ride on other banks’
monitoring efforts. In sum, an inherent property of transparency regulation
is that it escalates the leakage of banks’ proprietary information and hence
may reduce their profitability.
9
We feel that these effects of the financial safety net and the costs of transparency,
even though seemingly almost self-evident, have been overlooked in the cam-
paign for high-quality public disclosure in banking. When complying with trans-
                                                
6 The Basel Committee (1998a) acknowledges that incremental costs for banks due to transparency
requirements can be substantial. Mayes (1997) documents the fear of increased disclosure costs for
banks in New Zealand and the measures taken by the Reserve Bank to reduce them, in the context
of the regulatory reform of 1996. Moreover, in studying the financial stability-related need for
financial market data, Davis et al (1999, p. 107) argue while there seems to be ’an almost infinite
demand for data’ and a ’growing demand for increasingly complex data’, ’there are limits to what
data suppliers, particularly banks, on whom a significant burden falls in many countries, are will-
ing to supply.’ (see also footnote 4). Such reluctance by the banks to meet the growing data and
transparency needs reflects, if anything, the costs involved.
7 Disclosure alone may not suffice for bank transparency. There are for instance problems related
to proper measurement and communication of banking risks. Mayes and Vesala (1998, p. 22)
report that banks in New Zealand encountered difficulties in convincing the market of the quality
of their risk management after a new market-based system of banking supervision with stringent
disclosure requirements was implemented in 1996.
8 This point has been stressed by Rosengren (1998). He argues that transparency is to some extent
inconsistent with the very nature of bank lending, because loan transactions are based on confi-
dential relationships and because banks have private information on customers’ investment proj-
ects. See also Jordan et al (2000, p. 307).
9 Other indirect compliance costs might arise because the banking industry is heavily regulated.
Although a regulatory policy, considered in isolation, might not entail compliance costs, it could
create a burden to banks if the particular regulation were part of a comprehensive safety net. Such
regulatory compliance costs would thus be endogenous to the design of the financial safety net,
and any attempt to use regulatory policy to obtain a second-best solution would generate a third-
best outcome at most. In appendix 2 we consider one source of such indirect ’regulatory compli-
ance costs’, viz those costs that are caused by the interaction of transparency requirements with the
pricing of the DIS.10
parency regulation is costly, a tradeoff emerges. On the one hand, a transparency
requirement enhances market discipline and reduces the moral hazard temptation.
On the other hand, transparency requirements constitute an economic burden to
banks, which increases their private incentive to take risks. We show that if the
coverage of the DIS is broad, so as to dilute the beneficial effect of transparency
regulation on market discipline, the regulation eventually destabilizes the banking
system.
Another key insight in this article is that the impact of transparency regula-
tion on banks’ charter values deserves careful attention. A bank’s charter or fran-
chise value consists of its expected future profits. It is well understood that ex-
pected future profits can discipline banks by increasing the private cost of risk-
taking (see eg Herring and Vankudre 1987, Keeley 1990, Suarez 1994, Acharya
1996, Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan 1996, and Bhattacharya et al 1998). Fol-
lowing the reasoning for capital requirements in Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz
(2000), it is tempting to conclude that the costs of transparency requirements un-
dermine the charter value and thereby worsen the moral hazard problem. How-
ever, it turns out that the effect of transparency regulation on charter value de-
pends crucially on the nature of the regulation. The intuitive negative effect pre-
vails if the compliance costs are direct or monitoring information is a private
good. If monitoring information is a public good, transparency requirements may
boost the charter value, because for a given monitoring effort, a bank can by free-
riding increase its success probability. This creates an unforeseen rationale for
transparency regulation.
Finally, we propose a new welfare-related justification for transparency
regulation. In our model depositors’ self-fulfilling expectations lead to multiple
equilibria when banks’ risk profiles are unobservable. The transparency require-
ment works like the deposit insurance in Matutes and Vives (1996) in removing
the 'bad' equilibrium, ie the collapse of the banking sector.
Perhaps the articles most closely related to our study are Shy and Stenbacka
(1999), Matutes and Vives (2000), and especially Cordella and Levy Yeyati
(1998a, b). Shy and Stenbacka (1999) and Matutes and Vives (2000) analyze the
impact of market power on banks’ risk-taking incentives. In both models, banks
compete on the basis of observable asset quality, and the introduction of flat pre-
mium deposit insurance eliminates the beneficial effects of the competition.
Matutes and Vives (2000) also show that unobservable portfolio risk, along with
limited liability, leads to maximal risk taking incentives. Cordella and Levy
Yeyati (1998a, b) compare unobservable and observable asset portfolio risks.
Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998a) point out that if the shocks are economy-wide
and banks cannot control their asset portfolio risks, then full transparency of
banks' risk positions may destabilize the banking system. Cordella and Levy
Yeyati (1998b) analyze the pricing of a DIS and the observability of portfolio risk.
They establish an interesting equivalence result: full transparency and a risk-based
DIS lead to an equal risk-taking incentive.
Our analysis is also related to the literature dealing with the moral hazard
problem caused by a DIS. The proposed remedies include risk-based insurance
premiums, capital adequacy requirements, incentive-compatible DISs, banks’ eq-
uity investments, and intertemporal asset diversification (see eg Chan, Greenbaum
and Thakor 1992, Craine 1995, Kupiec and O’Brien 1998, Santos 1999, and Ni-
inimäki 2000). We complement these efforts by studying how the transparency
requirement and banks' charter values mitigate the moral hazard problem.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In section 2, we set out a model
of horizontal differentiation where banks compete for depositors on the basis of11
asset quality. To keep our analysis as simple and comparable with the previous
literature as possible, we adopt the standard model of spatial competition devel-
oped by Salop (1979). This model - and its cousin, the Hotelling line - has been
used extensively in the banking literature, eg in Williamson (1987), Besanko and
Thakor (1992), Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1995), Matutes and Vives
(1996), and Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999). In particular, the setup in
Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998b) is quite similar to ours. In section 3 we evalu-
ate the various costs of transparency regulation and prove our main proposition
that transparency regulation may increase financial fragility. In section 4, we pro-
vide a rationale for the transparency requirement and DIS. Concluding remarks
are given in section 5. We also perform a series of robustness checks in appendi-
ces 2-4, where we elaborate on our assumptions regarding interest rate competi-
tion, pricing of deposit insurance and the possibility of voluntary disclosure.12
2  The Basic Model
Consider a universally risk-neutral economy with a horizontally differentiated
banking industry where there are Q banks, indexed by L 1, …,Q. As usual, the
banks are assumed to locate themselves symmetrically on a unit circle.
10 There is
a continuum of potential depositors uniformly distributed along the circle. Fol-
lowing the earlier literature, eg Williamson (1987), Besanko and Thakor (1992),
Chiappori et al (1995) and Matutes and Vives (1996), all depositors incur a 'trans-
portation cost' when traveling to a bank. The cost per unit of distance is t. This
cost need not to be interpreted geographically, as it includes all market participa-
tion costs and frictions of depositing that are valued or incurred in different ways
by each depositor. The depositor’s 'distance' from a particular bank is denoted by
[.
The financial safety net in our model consists of a deposit insurance scheme
(DIS). The same reasoning applies to the other parts of the safety net in so far
these impair market discipline.
11 The size of deposits is denoted by G < 1. We
normalize to unity the banks’ repayment obligation, ie the debt that banks owe to
depositors.
12 As a result, the interest factor (interest rate plus one) can be written
as G
-1. The DIS is such that the depositors receive a fraction s of the promised
repayment if a bank defaults. We assume that the parameter s reflects the de facto
coverage of the DIS.
13
The banks invest the collected funds in risky projects (loans). The probabil-
ity that a unit of deposit funds invested in bank L’s portfolio will yield a positive
return is denoted SL. The net return or profit margin over the deposit unit is de-
noted by Pandthe probability of a zero return is 1-SL. If a bank’s projects fail, the
bank itself also fails. We assume that the only cost of a bank failure is that the
depositors of the failing bank suffer the loss of their funds to the extent that they
are not insured.
Clearly, the probability of bank failures is affected by banks’ lending and
monitoring decisions. The success probability reflects the bank’s screening and
monitoring decisions and ultimately its ability to gather information for building a
high quality loan portfolio We thus assume that SL is a strictly increasing and con-
cave function of a bank’s monitoring effort, HL, ie SLº S(HL) with SH > 0 and SHH <
                                                
10 As eg Stole (1995) notes, this assumption of equidistant intervals between banks is in accor-
dance with the principle of maximal differentiation. We take the number of the banks, Q, as given.
Ignoring banks’ entry and location decisions allows us to focus on the determination of the bank
failure rate.
11 Note that some parts of the safety net, such as the lender-of-last-resort arrangement, increase
banks’ charter values, which complicates the evaluation in a dynamic setting. Nonetheless, for a
sufficiently high discount rate, the effect a lender of last resort is similar to the DIS (calculations
proving this point are available from the authors upon request).
12 To present our main argument as clearly as possible, we initially make quite a few assumptions
that are admittedly relatively strong. For the most of the article, the interest rate is taken as given
and no deposit insurance premium is charged to the banks. We show that these assumptions can be
made without loss of generality in appendices 2 and 3. Moreover, up to section 4 we do not ex-
plicitly model the rationale for the DIS.
13 There is a significant variation in the extent of the DIS across countries. In many countries,
notably in the US, the de facto safety net has as a rule been extended prior to the explicit guarantee
entailed in the DIS. If the de jure boundaries of the safety net are known to be flexible in practice,
eg if uninsured depositors also are protected when failing banks are resolved, the behavior of these
claimants on banks is affected accordingly (Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux 1999).13
0.
14 In the spirit of modern banking theory, increasing SL is costly because of in-
formation gathering costs, ie because of the ex ante interim and ex post monitor-
ing costs that necessarily burden banks if they want to improve their lending
quality. The costs might also reflect investments in risk management techniques,
such as information systems, databases and credit scoring models. Except when
evaluating the direct costs of transparency, we can simply let bank L’s cost func-
tion be HL without loss of generality. Moreover, SL is concave, reflecting diminish-
ing returns on monitoring effort.
The crucial ingredient of the model is that the success probability SL is only
imperfectly observable. We assume in particular that only a fraction, a of the
depositors is informed. The rest of the depositors evaluate bank L’s asset risk posi-
tions according to the expectation E(SL) =
H
L S . In equilibrium, these beliefs are ful-
filled, as the uninformed depositors infer that the banks’ failure probabilities are
those that prevail in the Nash equilibrium. The model thus captures a rudiment of
the rational expectations folklore (Matutes and Vives 1996, 2000).
The portion of informed depositors depends on banks' information disclo-
sure policy. Such information disclosure is however costly. These costs are
spelled out in the subsequent section. We initially assume that the banks voluntar-
ily provide no information, and prove in appendix 4 that under plausible condi-
tions the assumption is not restrictive. The parameter a can thus be identified asD
WUDQVSDUHQF\UHTXLUHPHQW imposed by the regulatory authority. Our principal in-
terest is to investigate how the transparency requirement affects the probability of
bank failures.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the depositors form a common as-
sessment of the success probability of each bank. Second, the banks choose their
success probabilities, which are observed only by the informed depositors. Fi-
nally, the depositors choose their banks. An alternative description of the timing is
that the uninformed and informed depositors are assumed to deposit in the banks
in the first and the third stage, respectively.
A bank competes for depositors via its repayment probability, S. Following
the usual practice we take the number of banks, Q, as given, and focus entirely on
symmetric equilibria. Let us now focus on the behavior of an informed depositor
located at distance [ Î [0, Q
-1] from bank L. The bank is able to attract a depositor
only if the expected return on the deposit is nonnegative and the repayment con-
tract is more lucrative than those offered by rival banks. The participation con-
straint of the informed depositor is
[ G S S L L t s ³ - - + ) 1 ( (1)
and bank L’s repayment contract is more attractive than its rivals if
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 [ Q G S S [ G S S L L - - - - + ³ - - - +
- t s t s (2)
where  S  = SM for M¹L. Combining (1) and (2) shows that the informed depositor
chooses bank L if
                                                
























L L L (3)
The condition for an uninformed depositor is perfectly analogous and is not de-
rived explicitly.
In the terminology of Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999), we focus on
IXOOVFDOHFRPSHWLWLRQ, ie we assume that t is small enough to guarantee that the
market will be covered in equilibrium.
15 Under full-scale competition, the total
supply of funds for bankL is





















Bank L’s profits in a period can now be written as
L L L L H P' S - = p (5)
To keep the per-period profits constant, we assume that a failed bank is replaced
by a new bank. Evaluating the value functions at the end of each period, bank L’s
charter value, 9L￿ solves  () L L L L 9 S 9 + = p d  where d is the common discount factor.

































Equation (7) already provides the essential insights to the interaction of a bank’s
charter value with regulatory interventions. The second term in (7) shows how the
threat of a bankruptcy clearly renders the bank prudential. Because of the limited
liability, the bankruptcy costs are essentially the opportunity costs of lost future
profits. The higher the charter value, the higher the bank’s private cost of asset
portfolio risk. All regulatory interventions that reduce future profits also reduce
banks' incentive to avoid bankruptcy.
By using equations (4)-(5), symmetry, and rational prior beliefs,
S S S S S
H H
L L º = = = , equation (7) can be simplified to
                                                
15 An implication of this assumption is that we leave aside the local monopoly and touching mar-
kets cases. For a characterization of such market structures and the associated equilibria, see eg
Salop (1979), Matutes and Vives (1996), Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999). A further restric-
tion on the scope of the present analysis is that we focus on local interactions between banks, ie on
ORFDOFRPSHWLWLRQ so that the potential market share of a bank consists of depositors located be-





























Assuming that SL is sufficiently concave to ensure that the second-order conditions
for a maximum are satisfied, equation (8) implicitly determines the equilibrium
success probability in the banking industry as a function of a, d, s, t, P and Q.
Their impact on financial fragility in this basic model can be summarized as fol-
lows.
5HPDUNThe probability of bank failures is directly related (i) the discount rate
(GH/Gd³0), (ii) the coverage of the DIS (GH/Gs£0), (iii) the participation costs
(GH/Gt£0), and (iv) the number of banks (GH/GQ£0) and inversely related to (v) the
profit margin, P (GH/GP³0) and (vi) the level of transparency (GH/Ga³0).
3URRI:As the proof for (i) is slightly trickier than the straightforward proofs for
(ii)-(vi), we explicitly prove only part (i). The condition that banks’ equilibrium
charter values are strictly positive is given by 9(H)>0, where H solves (8). By using
(4)-(6), condition 9(H)>0 turns out to be equivalent to SPQH>0. Finally, totally
differentiating (8) with respect to H and d shows that the sign of GH/Gd is given by
the sign of SP-QH.
4('
These findings are as expected and for the most part well-known from previous
work: as profitability deteriorates, its disciplinary role diminishes. Especially part
(iv), the impact of market power on the probability of bank failures, has inten-
sively been studied recently. For instance, Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998b) and
Matutes and Vives (2000) obtain a result similar to ours, and Shy and Stenbacka
(1999) provide a counter argument.
The main concern in this article is to isolate the effect of the transparency
requirement, a. The common view is that increasing the level of transparency
increases banks’ incentives to reduce their risk-taking. In short, it is widely
thought that GH/Ga> 0, and part (vi) in remark 1 uncovers the static disciplinary
mechanism underlying this common view. However, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, this argumentation has two prominent defects. The contracting force of the
financial safety net can already be observed from (8). If s= 1, the transparency
requirement is irrelevant. Another and perhaps the more important defect of the
argumentation is that it ignores direct and indirect compliance costs of transpar-
ency. Proper evaluation of the transparency argument necessitates incorporation
of these costs into the model.
Before proceeding, we verify the initial assumption that full-scale competi-
tion prevails if the participation costs are sufficiently small. The sufficient condi-
tion for full-scale competition can be written as
() 0
2





By remark 1, S is decreasing in t. Consequently, the inequality (9) holds if t is
sufficiently small.16
3  The Effect of Transparency Regulation
on Financial Fragility
In this section we introduce the direct and indirect compliance costs of transpar-
ency in order to investigate their potential of undermining the static disciplinary
effect or the dynamic effect stemming from banks’ charter values. We illustrate
three sources of such compliance costs. In the first scenario, direct compliance
costs stemming from disclosure are considered. In the second and third scenarios,
compliance costs are indirect, because they are caused by leakage of information
gathered by a bank to its rivals. The second scenario is based on the assumption
that monitoring information is primarily a private good; in the third scenario this
information is treated as a public good. Although these three scenarios are pre-
sented separately in order to specify the basic mechanisms that we wish to empha-
size, they can be combined in a straightforward manner.
3.1  The Effect of Direct Transparency Costs
In this scenario we focus on the direct transparency costs that banks incur in com-
plying with transparency requirements. It is assumed that these costs directly enter
the bank’s cost function.
$VVXPSWLRQ Bank L’s cost function is given by Fi = HL + a + VaHL.
In this formulation of the cost function, the parameter V (scope) captures the sign
of the cross-partial derivative ¶
2FL/¶HL¶a. Depending on whether V is positive or
negative, there are diseconomies or economies of scope in monitoring and
achieving transparency. Except for the introduction of a into the cost-function, the
analysis of the basic model in section 2 remains unchanged. Using FL from as-






























By inspecting (10) we can prove the following claim.
352326,7,21 If economies of scope in monitoring and achieving transpar-
ency are at most moderate and the coverage of the DIS is sufficiently broad, an
increase in the transparency requirement increases the probability of bank failures.
Otherwise, the reverse obtains.
3URRI: Differentiating (10) with respect to H and a shows that the sign of GH/Ga is
















From (11) we obtain a necessary condition on V for GH/Ga< 0. If V£  V ~ , where V ~












it holds for all s that GH/Ga³ 0. Similarly, a sufficient condition in sfor GH/Ga<



























then GH/Ga < 0. In appendix 1 we prove the uniqueness of the threshold levels of V
and s as implicitly defined by (12) and (13).
4('
We can now articulate the tradeoff underlying this finding. The first term in (11)
captures the disciplinary effect from the increased transparency consisting of the
response in the supply of funds to changes in bank risk. The disciplinary effect
that reduces the incentive to risk-taking is the stronger, the larger the share of un-
insured deposits. This benefit of the enhanced market discipline should be
weighed against the reduction in the bank’s charter value caused by the costs of
transparency regulation. The second and the third term in (11) capture these costs.
If the supply response of funds is weak and economies of scope in monitoring and
achieving transparency are at most moderate, the charter value effect dominates
the disciplinary effect.
Our main point is thus embodied in proposition 1: there are plausible cir-
cumstances in which a transparency requirement increases financial fragility. Note
that the threshold level of V in (12) is negative. This means that transparency
regulation is certain to stabilize the banking sector only if there are significant
economies of scope. Conversely, if there are significant diseconomies of scope,
transparency regulation is certain to destabilize the banking sector. The following
example illustrates how GLVeconomies of scope emerge from banks’ balance
sheets, even with a separable cost function.
([DPSOHLet V= 0 in the cost function specified by assumption 1, ie bank L’s
cost function is FL = a+ Hi. Moreover, assume that the bank’s balance sheet holds,
ie that $L￿+ a + HL = 'LG, where $L denotes bank L’s asset portfolio investments. We
now show that although the 'scope' parameter V is set to 0 at the outset, the balance
sheet constraint ultimately generates diseconomies of scope. When the balance
sheet constraint is imposed, bank L’s deposits have to cover all its investment ex-
penses so that bank L can invest only amount $L. The one-period profits of bank L
from (5) can in this case be rewritten as  () L L L L L H ' \$ S - - - = a p , where
1 ) 1 (
- + º G P \ captures the gross return on the investment portfolio for a unit of
funds invested. Using the balance sheet constraint yields
() ( ) \ S H P' S L L L L L + + - = 1 a p , so that bank L’s effective cost function can be
written as &i = (a+ HL)(1 + SL\). It is clear that ¶
2&i/¶HL¶a= \¶S/¶HL > 0.18
It is however plausible to assert that recent advances in information technology
have diminished other sources of diseconomies of scope besides the balance sheet
constraint and have enlarged the welfare-improving potential of transparency
regulation. To sketch an argument to this direction, we consider another specific
example of the model.
([DPSOH. Let d= 0 and S(HL) = (2gHL)
1/2 where parameter g captures the effi-
ciency of banks’ monitoring technology. By using the specification of example 2,













it always holds that GH/Ga < 0. Equation (14) renders straightforward policy ad-
vice. The more efficient the bank’s monitoring technology, the more likely that
transparency regulation will be effective. Moreover, one could argue that innova-
tions that increase the efficiency of monitoring technology also reduce the trans-
portation costs and diseconomies of scope.
3.2  The Effect of Indirect Transparency Costs
The indirect costs of transparency arise from the information intensity of moni-
toring investments in the banking industry and the weak protection of informa-
tional property. We first focus on the possibility that transparency worsens the
appropriability problems related to the profitable use of banks’ monitoring infor-
mation. We then consider the case in which transparency increases bank's oppor-
tunities to free ride on monitoring information produced by rival banks. In what
follows, we suppress the direct transparency costs and return to the simple cost
function of the basic model. In other words, we assume that bank L’s costs are
simply HL.
3.2.1  Monitoring Information as a Private Good
To highlight our argument, we assume that information is initially perfectly ex-
cludable and that transparency regulation renders it partially non-excludable. We
postulate that the transparency requirement has an impact on the profit margin via
the following reduced form:





















The property GPL/GSL = -a of the profit margin indicates how the transparency
requirement leads to an information leakage from bank L and reduces the bank’s
revenues generated eg by its private information on its customers’ investment
projects. As the level of transparency increases, the amount of information spill-
ing across rival banks increases. However, the transparency requirement also in-
creases bank L’s opportunities to use information gathered by its rivals, ie GPL/GSM
= a(Q-1)
-1. Because of the private good assumption, the value of information ob-19
tained from another bank is the smaller, the greater the number of banks in the
market. In other words, transparency regulation treats banks symmetrically and
the information is evenly dispersed among the banks. The private good aspect is
also reflected in another property of the profit margin. When bank L gathers in-
formation more intensively than its rivals on average, GPL/Ga < 0.
Employing assumption 2 in (1)-(8) sharpens our predictions considerably.
Substituting PL from assumption 2 for P in the basic model and then proceeding

































Equation (15) yields a unique threshold coverage of the DIS, which determines
the sign of GS/Ga.
352326,7,21 If the coverage of the DIS is broad, an increase in the trans-
parency requirement increases the probability of bank failures. Otherwise, the
reverse obtains.
3URRI: Differentiating (15) with respect to H and a shows that  0 <
a G
GH












The explanations for propositions 1 and 2 are similar. There are costs and benefits
associated with transparency regulation. The benefits are the same, viz the static
disciplinary effect caused by the supply-of-funds response, but the cost sides dif-
fer. Although there are neither direct compliance costs nor an effect on the equi-
librium charter value, the information disclosure is costly because it weakens the
appropriability of the proprietary monitoring information. This can be seen from
equation (15) where the term -SaQ
-1 captures the static profit-reducing impact of
the information leakage. Proposition 2 also shows how the success of transpar-
ency regulation in stabilizing the banking market depends crucially on its struc-
ture. Because of the private-good assumption, the costs of transparency regulation
are inversely related to the number of banks in the market. When there is little
competition in the banking market, the prospects of a welfare-improving transpar-
ency regulation are restricted.
In order to obtain the clear-cut prediction of proposition 2, we had to make a
number of simplifying assumptions. Whether the information leakage affects only
the profit margin and leaves the success probability unchanged is a moot question.
It would perhaps be more orthodox to consider the source and destination of the
information spillovers to be the same activity. In other words, if the externality is
created by the transparency of a bank’s monitoring decisions, it should affect
mainly the other bank’s monitoring.
To evaluate the robustness of proposition 2 with respect to the activity
where the spillover occurs and to provide a link to the subsequent section where
information is regarded as a public good, we briefly consider an alternative model
of information as a private good.20




















1 a  denotes the effective monitoring investment.
Assumption 3 is identical to assumption 2 except that now both the source and
destination of the spillover is the monitoring effort. Although the use of assump-
tion 3 instead of assumption 2 complicates the equations slightly, an analysis











































By evaluating (16) we can prove the following claim.
352326,7,21 At relatively high levels of transparency, an increase in the
transparency requirement always increases the probability of a bank failure. At
relatively low levels of transparency, an increase in the transparency requirement
increases the probability of a bank failure when the coverage of the DIS is suffi-
ciently broad.
3URRI:Noting that in equilibrium, ( = H and differentiating (16) with respect to H



































As shown in the proof of remark 1, if banks’ equilibrium charter values are
strictly positive, then SP> HQ. The second term in (17) is thus always negative,
leading to two implications. First, a sufficient condition for GS/Ga < 0 is that a ³
(Q-1)(2Q)
-1 and, second, even if a < (Q-1)(2Q)
-1, GS/Ga <0 when s is sufficiently
large (because the first term in (17) decreases as s increases and approaches zero
as s approaches unity).
4('
Although the basic result remains unchanged, proposition 3 is less sharp than
proposition 2. The term 1-2aQ(Q-1)
-1 in (17) depicts a spillover effect similar to
the term -SSHaQ
-1 in (15), but now the effect is ambiguous. When information
leakage affects success probability, it simultaneously creates an opportunity for
free-riding and reduces the bank's marginal productivity (in terms of success
probability) of monitoring investment. At high levels of transparency, free-riding
is advantageous and the marginal productivity of monitoring investment is low.
Extensive transparency requirements therefore increase the vulnerability of the
banking sector. There may however be room for limited transparency require-
ments if the banking industry is competitive and the supply response of funds suf-
ficiently strong.
Another difference between the consequences of assumptions 2 and 3 is that
the charter-value effect is again operative, as under assumption 1. This effect can be21
seen from the second term in (17). Because information is a private good, the mar-
ginal productivity of monitoring investments diminishes as the level of transparency
requirement rises. Consequently, for a given level of monitoring effort, banks’
charter values are reduced. As we show in the following subsection, however, this
finding hinges on the private-good assumption on monitoring information.
3.2.2  Monitoring Information as a Public Good
There are reasons to believe that in banking industry information may be a private
good (see eg Anand and Galetovic 1999) even though information is usually con-
sidered a public good. In this section we elaborate on this view of information. As
in the previous subsection, we assume that initially property rights governing in-
formation are perfect but that transparency regulation weakens them.
$VVXPSWLRQ  Bank L’s success probability is given by  ) ( L L ( S S º  where
å = ¹ + =
Q
L M M L L H H (
1 a  denotes the effective monitoring investment.
Assumption 4 is a straightforward way of formalizing our view that the transpar-
ency requirement couldgenerate pure information spillovers between banks. A
similar spillover process is widely recognized in the economics of R&D. In par-
ticular, the spillover process initiated by Ruff (1969) and independently rediscov-
ered by Spence (1984) comes close to our approach.
As in assumption 3, transparency requirements under assumption 4 increase
banks’ opportunities to use monitoring information produced by rival banks in
their own monitoring. A concrete example might be the 'leakage' of creditworthi-
ness information that is specific to a customer group or industry. The main dis-
tinction between assumptions 3 and 4 is that now the information is a pure public
good. The marginal productivity of monitoring investment is unaffected by trans-
parency regulation, and the only cost of regulation is the free-riding incentive that
it generates. An implication of this distinction is that the equilibrium level of a
bank's effective monitoring investment, (, is now H(1+a(Q-1)) and consists hence
of the banks’ own monitoring effort and the spillover multiplier.
Employing the success probability from assumption 4, the analysis proceeds
as before. When the nature of information created by transparency regulation is
changed from private to public good, the role of the bank’s charter value also
changes. In contrast to the previous analysis, transparency regulation may boost
the charter value, because it increases the success probability for a given moni-
toring effort. This has a drastic effects on banks’ incentives to gather information
and on financial fragility. To see this, substitute S((L) from assumption 4 for S(HL)





























With the help of (18), we prove the following proposition.22
352326,7,21 At relatively high levels of transparency, an increase in the
transparency requirement may increase the probability of bank failure. At rela-
tively low levels of transparency, an increase in the transparency requirement al-
ways reduces the probability of bank failure.
3URRI: Define the left-hand side of (18) as a function of H and a and denote it by
I(H, a) and its derivatives by Iaº¶I/¶a, IHº¶I/¶H. Then the sign of G(/Ga is given by
the sign of









Because S(HL) has to be sufficiently concave to keep our model well-behaved, IH is
negative. The sign of (19) is thus the same as the sign of
() [] () 1 1 1 - - - + Q H I Q I H a a (20)
By calculating Ia￿and IH from (18), substituting them for (20) and simplifying the
resulting expression, we see that the sign of G(/Ga is given by the sign of
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(21)
The second term in (21) is always positive and increasing in d, which leads to two
implications: first, a sufficient condition for GH/Ga ³ 0 is a£ 1/2 and, second,
when a > 1/2, GH/Ga < 0 when d is sufficiently small. This follows because the
first term in (21) remains positive and the second term approaches zero as d ap-
proaches zero.
4('
Proposition 3 seemingly contradicts the findings of the previous propositions.
Nonetheless, the reasoning underlying this finding is familiar. As before, there is a
spillover effect and a charter value effect whose roles remain unaltered. The
charter value has, as before, a disciplinary role in mitigating moral hazard behav-
ior. The difference lies at the roots of the moral hazard problem. Now transpar-
ency regulation creates a new moral hazard problem. Since the information gener-
ated by transparency regulation is a public good, there is a strong free-ride incen-
tive. It is this moral hazard behavior that is partially eliminated by the charter
value. For a given level of a bank’s monitoring effort, transparency requirements
enhance its charter value, which in turn enhances the incentive to monitor. If
however market discipline is strong, large information spillovers tend to reduce
the success probability. Note that an extensive DIS eliminates not only the ad-
vantageous static effect of transparency regulation but also the disadvantageous
effect of large information spillovers.23
4  A Rationale for Transparency
In this section we provide a welfare rationale for deposit insurance and transpar-
ency regulation. In addition to laying these foundations for our main assumptions,
we continue to assess the robustness of our model in appendices 2 - 4.
It is often argued that deposit insurance is needed in order to avoid systemic
crises arising from the inherent fragility of the banking industry. We now follow
Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000) in providing such a rationale for deposit insur-
ance. It also turns out that the same argument applies to the transparency require-
ment. Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000) show how the banking sector may be vul-
nerable to self-fulfilling crises if there is a minimum size requirement for banks. If
a bank does not obtain the minimum market share, it cannot invest and fails with
probability one. Investors’ expectations then become self-fulfilling and the model
therefore exhibits multiple equilibria, one of which is a collapse of the banking
system. The introduction of deposit insurance prevents financial collapse by
eliminating the 'no-banking' equilibrium.
In our model the minimum size requirement could emerge for instance from
the economies of scale created by the balance sheet constraint considered in ex-
ample 1. Because of costs caused by monitoring investments and the disclosure
requirement imposed by the regulatory authorities, bank L needs a minimum mar-
ket share to operate.
Let us now consider the role of deposit insurance and transparency in a
model where a minimum market share is needed to make a bank operative. Sup-
pose initially that no deposit insurance scheme is in place. Without deposit insur-
ance, it is also true that depositors can lose their deposits if their banks fail. Sup-
pose further that the degree of transparency in the market is low, so that the num-
ber of informed market participants is small. As a result, there is a coordination
game on the uninformed depositors. If all the uninformed depositors expect that SL
= 0, ie that  0 =
H
L S , then bank L has no uninformed customers for any SL that it
may choose. Because only informed depositors are responsive to the bank’s actual
choice of SL and because the share of informed depositors is small, bank L cannot
credibly choose a positive repayment probability, since it cannot cover its invest-
ment expenses. Consequently, even informed depositors will not deposit in bank L,
which is then certain to fail. As L is arbitrary, the same reasoning applies to the
entire industry.
In sum, the expectations of the uninformed depositors are realized in the
equilibrium, and no one finds it profitable to unilaterally deviate from these
strategies. We have thus proven the following claim.
352326,7,21 With a sufficiently limited DIS (eg s ® 0) and a sufficiently
low degree of transparency (eg a ® 0), a financial collapse with 'L= 0 and SL=
0 =
H
L S  (L = 1,2, …,Q) is possible.
Note that the no-banking equilibrium coexists with the interior symmetric equilib-
rium characterized by full-scale competition. It is however sufficient that either
s® 1 or a ® 1 in order to eliminate the no-banking equilibrium. As a result,
there are possibilities for a welfare-improving transparency requirement and a
DIS, even if these increase moral hazard in the banking industry.24
5  Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this article we examine the validity of the frequently raised argument that a
stringent transparency requirement enhances market discipline and hence the
soundness of a banking sector in the presence of a DIS. We provide plausible
conditions under which this argument is and isnot valid. Besides evaluating the
received justifications for transparency regulation, we propose two novel justifi-
cations. First, if the information created by transparency regulation is a public
good, it enhances the banks’ charter value, boosting the monitoring incentives for
low levels of transparency. Second, even if bank transparency increases the prob-
ability of bank failure, it may prevent a complete collapse of the banking sector
arising from the self-fulfillment of depositors’ expectations.
Though there are several limitations to our simple model, we boldly offer
some policy recommendations based on our analysis. Firstly, in the campaigns for
the increased transparency, the associated costs - be they direct or indirect com-
pliance costs - should be given proper attention. The direct compliance costs stem
from the incremental investments in information and bookkeeping systems caused
by the transparency regulation. They dilute the bank’s charter value and thereby
reduce the private costs of increasing risk profile. The indirect costs may materi-
alize, because the protection of informational property is imperfect. Under exten-
sive transparency requirements, it can be difficult to exclude banks from using
their rivals’ monitoring information. Such appropriability problems reduce banks’
profit margins and lead to pervasive free-riding. If monitoring information is pri-
marily a private good, the indirect costs of transparency have the same negative
impact on the charter value as direct costs.
Secondly, the disclosure requirements could in principle be designed so as
to minimize the costs to banks. The mandatory production of information should
be useful for banks in managing their risks (see Mayes 1997 for a discussion in
this spirit). As a result, significant economies of scope could arise in risk man-
agement and achieving transparency. In this case, neither direct compliance costs
nor broad de facto coverage by the DIS would reduce the efficiency of stringent
disclosure requirements. The mandatory disclosure should also deal with public-
good-type information instead of the bank-specific proprietary information.
Finally, our findings support a partial DIS. Besides eroding market disci-
pline, an extensive DIS destroys the SRWHQWLDO of transparency for stabilizing the
banking system. In line with this view, New Zealand's 1996 reform of banking
supervision included tight disclosure requirements and an abolition of the DIS.25
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Appendix 1.  The Uniqueness of V ~ and s ~
We complete the proof of proposition 1 by showing that the threshold levels of V
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Differentiating (10) with respect to H and V shows that GH/GV£ 0 and hence (A1.2)
is unambiguously positive. Because w is strictly increasing in V, it follows that
there is only one V =V ~  such that w(V ~ ) = 0.
The proof for the uniqueness of s ~ is fairly tricky. Recall from (11) that the
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We want to prove that there is only one s = s ~ such that W(H(s ~)) = 0. To do this,
we show that whenever s = s ~, GW/Gs < 0. Because GH/Gs< 0 by remark 1, the
sign of GW/Gs is given by the sign of -¶W/¶H. Taking the partial derivative of W








































which can be rewritten by using (A1.4) as






















Because, by the proof of remark 1, SP > HQ, the first term in (A1.5) is always
strictly negative. As a result, when s = s ~ so that W(H(s ~)) = 0, (A1.5) is strictly
negative. In sum, if s = s ~, -¶W/¶H and hence GW/Gs are strictly negative. Thus
there can be only one s = s ~ such that W(H(s ~)) = 0.
4('30
Appendix 2.  Interest Rate Competition
Let us first introduce some notation. To sharpen the discussion we need to specify
the net return for a unit of deposits invested. With a slight abuse of the notation,
we write the net return as
P = \G-1 (A2.1)
where we continue to normalize the repayment obligation of banks, ie the debt the
banks owe to depositors, to unity and where \denotes the gross return on a unit of
funds invested. Without loss of generality, we also employ assumption 1 in this
appendix.
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that our main findings are
insensitive to the assumptions on the underlying interest rate competition. For the
full analysis of the interest rate competition and information disclosure, we refer
the reader to Cordella and Levy Yeyati (1998a, b) and Matutes and Vives (1996,
2000). To minimize the introduction of new variables, we continue to normalize
to unity banks’ debt to depositors. As a result, we can let GL refer to the inverse of
the deposit interest factor (interest rate plus one) of bank L. This means, among
others, that the net return in (A2.1) should be indexed, ie PL￿= \GL-1.
The choice of the interest rate is made simultaneously with the choice of SL.
The depositors observe the chosen deposit interest rates, and the banks are able to
commit to them. For tractability, we exclude signaling games by assuming that
uninformed depositors do not update their prior beliefs on the basis of quoted de-
posit interest rates. This means that the beliefs are fixed but fulfilled in equilib-
rium.
The analysis proceeds as in equations (1)-(8), except that the total supply of
deposits is now given by























As before, bankL maximizes its charter value. Using (A2.1) and (A2.2), symmetry
and rational prior beliefs, the first-order conditions for the decision variables SL




































Rewriting (A2.4) by means of (A2.1) as P= \t(Q)
-1 and inserting it into (A2.3)
















































Note that equation (A2.6) is essentially identical to (11). Hence, using the same
argumentation as in the proof of proposition 1, it can be verified that if the cover-
age of the DIS is sufficiently broad, GH/Ga < 0.
For the present purposes, the main message of this analysis and (A2.6) is
that one can exclude interest rate competition from the analysis of transparency
without loss of generality.32
Appendix 3.  Pricing of Deposit Insurance
In the basic model the funding of deposit insurance was implicit. We now make it
explicit and consider the two most common pricing systems of deposit insurance:
flat-premium and risk-based pricing.
1 In this appendix we return to the basic
model of section 2, ie transparency regulation involves neither direct compliance
costs nor information spillovers.
)ODW3UHPLXP 3ULFLQJ RI 'HSRVLW ,QVXUDQFH. Introducing flat-premium
pricing is easy. The only change is that the net return (A2.1) from appendix 2
should be re-expressed as
P(f) = \G(1-f)-1, (A3.1)
where fdenotes the flat insurance premium on a unit of funds insured. By using
(A3.1), the analysis of section 2 is fully valid under flat-premium pricing of de-
posit insurance. In particular, the first-order condition (8) can now be rewritten as
F-)f = 1, (A3.2)
where F denotes the left-hand side of the first-order condition in (8) and ) is a



















The first term in ) captures the supply response of deposits to changes in the
bank’s risk profile. Basically this means that payments to the deposit insurance
system increase as success probability increases, which dilutes the incentive to be
prudential. The second term in ) captures the effect of flat-premium pricing of
deposit insurance on banks’ profits and charter value, which also acerbates moral
hazard problems in the banking sector. In sum, because )> 0, a flat deposit insur-
ance premium on a unit of insured funds reduces the equilibrium values of H
and S.
It is easy to see from (A3.2) and (A3.3) that introducing the direct or indi-
rect compliance costs of transparency regulation would yield essentially similar
findings as in section 3. The only difference is that, because ¶)/¶a > 0, the flat-
premium pricing of deposit insurance further restricts the scope for welfare-
improving transparency regulation.
5LVNEDVHG3ULFLQJRI'HSRVLW,QVXUDQFH. We now show how the risk-based
premium is a source of transparency costs. We assume that the insurance premium
can be conditioned on the actual bank risk and that the premium is fairly priced.
Under these assumptions, Bank L’s value function can be rewritten as
                                                
1 In a recent survey of 68 countries, Garcia (1999) reports that the premiums base is in 34 countries
the insured deposits and in 27 countries the entire deposits stocks. Our qualitative results hold
under either assumption. Garcia (1999) also notifies a significant increase in the use of the risk-













where the insurance premium, rL, satisfies the fair-pricing condition
rL = (1-SL)s'L. (A3.5)
Maximizing first (A3.4) with respect HL, using equations (4), (5) and (A3.5), and
then imposing rational prior beliefs and symmetry on the first-order condition
yield
F-5r= 1.  (A3.6)
where F denotes the left-hand side of (8), r = (1-S)sQ and 5 is a coefficient of
the risk-based premium, defined as
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In (A3.7), the first-term in 5 characterizes the supply response of deposits to
changes in the banks’ risk profile, and the second term captures the effect of risk-
based pricing of deposit insurance on the bank’s charter value. This effect of
payments to the insurance system on the charter value is twofold. On the one
hand, the charter value decreases because of the payments. On the other hand, the
incentive to be prudential is strengthened, since prudential banks pay less to the
insurance system. The second-term in equation (A3.7) shows that the latter effect
dominates, so that the risk-based DIS reduces financial fragility, unless the supply
response of deposits to changes in banks’ risk-profile is strong. What is important
here is that the magnitude of the supply response in (A3.7) depends on a. The
following result emerges:
352326,7,21$ Under a risk-based deposit insurance premium, an increase
in the transparency requirement may increase the probability of bank failure.
3URRI: Differentiate (A3.6) with respect to H and a to see that the sign of GH/Ga is
given by
) 1 ( S SP - -s . (A3.8)
Note that, under a risk-based premium, H may be either decreasing, increasing or
non-monotonic in sand therefore it is difficult to sign (A2.8) in terms of s. In any
case, the expression in (A3.8) increases as P increases. Thus there exists an P ~
such that
[] 0 )) ~ ( ( 1 ~ )) ~ ( ( = - - P H S P P H S s (A3.9)
Finally, if  P P ~ < , then GH/Ga< 0, which proves our claim.
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Appendix 4.  Voluntary Information Disclosure
In this appendix we prove our claim that the banks do not voluntarily provide any
information on their risk-profiles. Let aL refer to the transparency of bank L,and
assume itis a decision variable for bank L. Suppose that aLÎ[0,1] and that it is
chosen simultaneously with SL.
352326,7,21$ There is no information disclosure in the market equilib-
rium without regulatory intervention.
3URRI:We derive the explicit proof under assumption 1, ie transparency regulation
is assumed to cause direct compliance costs. The proof for the indirect costs is
perfectly analogous. Index the as included in (4)-(6) and take the derivative of the
value function with respect to aL so as to see that the sign of ¶9L/¶aL is determined




L VH S S
P S
- - - - 1 1
t
s . (A4.1)
Imposing rational prior beliefs on (A3.1) immediately yields that ¶9L/¶aL is eve-
rywhere negative.
4('
A quick inspection of (A4.1) explains this finding. The banks would disclose in-
formation if it were remunerative. However equation (A4.1) reveals that such a
possibility can arise only if the depositors systematically underestimate the suc-
cess probability. This possibility can be excluded by the standard rationality as-
sumption.
In looking merely at the first-order conditions, our discussion of the volun-
tary information disclosure admittedly remains sketchy, and there might be other
reasons why information disclosure might be remunerative, eg it might be a sig-
naling device. But the possibility of a signaling game is excluded by assumption
from the outset in our model. It is also clear that if the information created by
motoring investments is a public good, the banks have an incentive to engage in
information exchange after the investments are sunk. In other words, there are
gains from trade. One could perhaps construct games where these gains are real-
ized. We, however, conjecture that our claims would hold even if information
were disclosed voluntarily, provided that the mandatory disclosure requirements
were stronger than the voluntary information disclosure. It is indeed difficult to
see why transparency would be such an issue in the first place, if it were profitable
for banks.